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[In November 2005, the Victorian government introduced a series of homicide law reforms, central to 
which was the implementation of a new offence of defensive homicide. The reforms followed from 
significant debate surrounding the use of the partial defence of provocation, particularly in relation 
to male-perpetrated intimate homicides. Since the new offence was implemented in 2005, a pattern of 
plea deals to defensive homicide has emerged, which, due to the private nature of plea bargaining in 
Victoria, has created difficulties in understanding how the offence is operating in practice. Informed 
by 63 interviews conducted with Victorian legal professionals, this article argues that greater 
transparency and scrutiny of plea bargaining is needed in Victoria in order to increase public 
confidence in the administration of justice, and to enable an informed understanding of why these 
cases are perceived and ultimately treated by the Crown as a less serious form of homicide.] 
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I   IN T R O D U C T I O N 
The offence of defensive homicide was introduced in Victoria in November 
20051 as part of a wider package of homicide law reforms recommended by the 
Victorian Law Reform Commission (‘VLRC’).2 The reforms sought to provide 
clarity to the partial defences to murder, and to respond to growing concerns that 
homicide law was operating in a gender-biased way. In particular, the operation 
of homicide law in Victoria was seen to disadvantage women who killed their 
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 1 Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 9AD, as inserted by Crimes (Homicide) Act 2005 (Vic) s 6. 
 2 VLRC, Defences to Homicide: Final Report (2004). 
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male abusers, while simultaneously excusing the use of lethal violence commit-
ted by men against their female intimate partners.3 
To date,4 there have been only five cases in which an accused person has been 
found guilty of the offence of defensive homicide following a contested trial.5 In 
the remaining 16 cases, the matter has been finalised by the Crown accepting a 
guilty plea from the accused.6 Given that a guilty plea to defensive homicide can 
only be entered upon the Crown agreeing to withdraw any additional homicide-
related charges, it is likely that many of these cases involved plea bargaining. 
While the pragmatic, emotion-based and financial benefits of obtaining a guilty 
plea are well established,7 the use of plea bargaining to resolve defensive 
homicide cases raises concern because it limits the ability to effectively evaluate 
the practical application of this new offence, including its impact on gender bias 
in the operation of homicide law. This inability is primarily due to the hidden 
nature of plea bargaining in Victoria, which arises from the fact that the process 
is not recognised in, or controlled by, any statute. Additionally, no administrative 
data is kept outlining when or why a plea bargain has been made, which serves 
to further limit current understandings of the operation of defensive homicide. In 
particular, this absence of transparency hinders understanding of how decisions 
are being made in relation to what constitutes defensive homicide, and why the 
circumstances surrounding these cases allow for them to be categorised by the 
Crown as a less serious form of homicide. 
Informed by 63 interviews conducted with Victorian legal professionals, this 
article provides a unique insight into the problems associated with the unscruti-
nised decision-making powers of prosecutors in plea bargaining, specifically in 
relation to the operation of defensive homicide in Victoria since 2005. In 
drawing from the experiences of those charged with the daily implementation of 
the law, this article contends that it is not the existence of prosecutorial discretion 
that is the key problem in evaluating the effectiveness of the offence, but rather 
that it is the potentially idiosyncratic nature of these discretionary decisions that 
 
 3 See, eg, Phil Cleary, ‘Julie’s Judicial Betrayal’, Herald Sun (Melbourne), 29 October 2004, 20; 
Jenny Morgan, ‘Provocation Law and Facts: Dead Women Tell No Tales, Tales Are Told about 
Them’ (1997) 21 Melbourne University Law Review 237; ibid 14–17. 
 4 This article is based on an analysis of the cases resolved between 1 November 2005 and 30 April 
2012. 
 5 R v Croxford [2009] VSC 516 (16 October 2009); R v Parr [2009] VSC 468 (16 October 2009); 
R v Middendorp [2010] VSC 202 (19 May 2010); R v Svetina [2011] VSC 392 (22 August 2011); 
R v Creamer [2011] VSC 196 (20 April 2011). 
 6 See Table 1 in below Part VII. 
 7 See John B Bishop, Prosecution without Trial (Butterworths, 1989) 184–5; John Jay Douglass, 
Ethical Issues in Prosecution (National College of District Attorneys, 1988); Asher Flynn, ‘Non-
Transparent Justice and the Plea Bargaining Process in Victoria’ in Marie Segrave (ed), 
Australian and New Zealand Critical Criminology Conference 2009 — Conference Proceedings 
(Department of Criminology, Monash University, 2009) 88, 89; Asher Flynn, ‘Victoria’s Legal 
Aid Funding Structure: Hindering the Ideals Inherent to the Pre-Trial Process’ (2010) 34 
Criminal Law Journal 48, 50; Robert D Seifman and Arie Freiberg, ‘Plea Bargaining in Victoria: 
The Role of Counsel’ (2001) 25 Criminal Law Journal 64, 72; JUSTICE, Negotiated Justice: A 
Closer Look at the Implications of Plea Bargains (1993) 5–6; Mike McConville, ‘Plea 
Bargaining: Ethics and Politics’ (1998) 25 Journal of Law and Society 562; Chief Justice Peter 
Underwood, ‘The Trial Process: Does One Size Fit All?’ (2006) 15 Journal of Judicial 
Administration 165, 170–1. 
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creates difficulties. Furthermore, we argue that the absence of transparency 
surrounding plea deals fuels public perceptions of clandestine outcomes, 
inequality and a lack of accountability in plea bargaining practices more gener-
ally. This article thus proposes that an improved system of plea bargaining, 
which incorporates the ideals of open and transparent justice, is essential in order 
to adequately understand how defensive homicide has operated, particularly 
within the context of gendered violence. Greater transparency and scrutiny 
would also serve to heighten public confidence in the legal process.8 
The significance of our analysis is heightened by the postponement by the 
Victorian Department of Justice (‘DOJ’) of its review of defensive homicide. 
Based on the recommendations of the VLRC,9 the DOJ commenced a review of 
the operation of the offence in August 2010. Initially, this involved the release of 
a discussion paper,10 which questioned whether defensive homicide should be 
retained, reformed or abolished, and sought to examine whether the offence was 
operating in line with the goals and expectations of the broader homicide law 
reforms. In response, stakeholders were asked to submit opinions on the central 
issues identified by the DOJ in the first five years of the offence’s operation. 
However, following the November 2010 state election loss by the Labor gov-
ernment, this review has been delayed. While the current Attorney-General, 
Robert Clark, has indicated that this review will continue at some stage under the 
Liberal-National government,11 at present, the offence continues to operate 
without an in-depth assessment of its effectiveness and, due to the significant use 
of plea deals, with little transparency and understanding of its operation. 
I I   RE S E A R C H  DE S I G N 
This analysis is informed by the findings of two research studies: Project A, 
which examined the informality of plea bargaining and prosecutorial decision-
making in Victoria between 2007 and 2009;12 and Project B, which examined the 
implications of homicide law reforms in three jurisdictions (Victoria, the United 
Kingdom (‘UK’) and New South Wales (‘NSW’)), introduced to target partial 
defences to murder.13 As part of the research conducted in Project A, 42 Victo-
rian legal participants were interviewed, including 11 defence counsel, 19 
prosecutors, 7 members of the judiciary and 5 policy advisors/government 
representatives. In Project B, 81 interviews were conducted with legal partici-
 
 8 See Stanley A Cohen and Anthony N Doob, ‘Public Attitudes to Plea Bargaining’ (1989) 32 
Criminal Law Quarterly 85. 
 9 VLRC, above n 2, xiv–lvi. 
 10 DOJ, ‘Defensive Homicide: Review of the Offence of Defensive Homicide’ (Discussion Paper, 
August 2010). 
 11 ABC Radio, ‘Victoria Debating Defensive Homicide’, PM, 4 March 2011 (Samantha Donovan) 
<http://www.abc.net.au/pm/content/2011/s3155692.htm>. 
 12 This project was completed as part of a doctoral thesis: see Asher Flynn, Secret Deals and 
Bargained Justice: Lifting the Veil of Secrecy Surrounding Plea Bargaining in Victoria (PhD 
Thesis, Monash University, 2009). 
 13 This project was completed as part of a doctoral thesis: see Kate Fitz-Gibbon, The Aftermath of 
Provocation: Homicide Law Reform in Victoria, New South Wales and England (PhD Thesis, 
Monash University, 2012). 
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pants from NSW (comprising 8 defence counsel, 5 prosecutors and 8 members of 
the judiciary), the UK (comprising 20 legal counsel, 6 members of the judiciary 
and 3 policy representatives) and Victoria (comprising 10 defence counsel, 8 
prosecutors, 8 members of the judiciary and 5 policy representatives). This 
article draws specifically from 63 of the Victorian interviews conducted across 
both projects (including interviews with 21 defence counsel, 27 prosecutors and 
15 members of the judiciary), thereby excluding the comments of the NSW and 
UK interviewees (from Project B) and the comments of the policy advi-
sors/government representatives (interviewed in Project A and Project B). These 
comments were excluded because these participants had no direct experience 
working with plea bargaining or homicide law in Victoria. 
The Victorian participants were representative of a diverse range of experience 
and seniority within various organisations, including the Victorian Office of 
Public Prosecutions (‘OPP’), the Melbourne metropolitan criminal courts, the 
Criminal Bar Association and Victorian Legal Aid. They included 1 articled 
clerk, 6 instructing and junior solicitors, 16 Crown prosecutors and programme 
managers, 4 education and development staff, 2 witness assistance service 
counsellors, 4 legal aid solicitors and barristers, 20 Queen’s and Senior Counsel, 
1 magistrate, 4 judges of the County Court and 9 justices of the Supreme Court. 
In order to maintain confidentiality and anonymity, participants were assigned 
pseudonyms and a random sequential letter: for example, Prosecutor A, 
Defence A, Judiciary C. For the purposes of this article, participants also have 
‘PA’ (Project A) or ‘PB’ (Project B) cited in brackets after their pseudonym, to 
illustrate which project they were involved in. 
In both projects, the participants were asked to comment on a range of legal 
issues pertinent to the operation of the criminal law, including, but not limited to, 
homicide law reform (Project B), the operation of defensive homicide (Pro-
ject B), plea bargaining (Project A) and prosecutorial discretionary powers 
(Project A). Participants were also asked to discuss the benefits and limitations 
of various suggested reforms to the criminal justice system in relation to increas-
ing transparency and accountability in plea bargaining (Project A) and evaluating 
existing and proposed changes to the law of homicide (Project B). The average 
interview duration across both projects was 50 minutes. The data recorded 
included descriptions of behaviours, institutions, court processes, appearances, 
actions, interactions, personal narratives and accounts of prior experiences of 
plea bargaining and homicide law. The data was analysed in the context of its 
own study, before being contrasted with data obtained from the other project. 
This allowed the responses to be explored individually, collectively and com-
paratively. 
Semi-structured interviews were utilised because they allow for the inclusion 
of both direct and open-ended questions, which permits comparative analysis of 
responses while still providing sufficient flexibility to seek elaboration and 
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clarification from the participant.14 The questions were tailored to the partici-
pant’s occupation (for example, prosecutor, defence counsel, judge), allowing the 
researcher to draw specifically from their direct experiences with plea bargaining 
and homicide law. Furthermore, all participants were asked whether they 
considered their views to be indicative of the group that they represented. 
Overwhelmingly, the participants believed their views were reflective of their 
colleagues and, as such, there is a basis for claiming that the voices in this article 
are reflective of a more general Victorian legal view. Additionally, we attempt to 
compensate for any potential limitations of our study in relation to the number or 
diversity of perspectives interviewed by reference to wider research findings in 
the field. 
Due to the lack of visibility surrounding plea bargaining and, specifically, the 
absence of any administrative data on plea bargaining in Victoria, the interviews 
offered a mechanism to understand how plea bargaining operates from the 
perspectives of those directly involved in the process.15 In addition, the inter-
views allowed for the investigation of how individuals interpret plea bargaining, 
and offered a way to capture the variation between what should happen accord-
ing to internal policy and what does happen in practice. The data thus enables 
this discussion to move beyond conceptual statements, to a determination of 
what actually occurs in the daily operation of the law. This is particularly 
beneficial in the context of defensive homicide, given that 16 of the 21 cases 
finalised at 30 April 2012 have resulted from the Crown’s acceptance of a guilty 
plea. 
I I I   HO M I C I D E  LAW RE F O R M  I N  VI C TO R I A 
In 2004, the VLRC commenced an extensive review of the partial defences to 
murder, which culminated in the Defences to Homicide report.16 Within this 
report, the VLRC recommended a host of reforms to minimise the key problems 
identified in the operation of the law of homicide, in particular that the contro-
versial partial defence of provocation be abolished.17 As part of this reform 
package, the VLRC proposed that a partial defence of excessive self-defence be 
implemented to provide a safety net for women who kill in response to pro-
longed family violence.18 When successfully used, this partial defence would 
reduce murder to manslaughter and would be available to persons who killed in 
self-defence. The VLRC reasoned that the operation of the defence would 
sufficiently recognise the lesser culpability of those persons, while still acknowl-
 
 14 Fiona Devine and Sue Heath, Sociological Research Methods in Context (MacMillan, 1999) 189; 
Irving Seidman, Interviewing as Qualitative Research: A Guide for Researchers in Education 
and the Social Sciences (Teachers Press College, 1998) 104. 
 15 Asher Flynn, ‘Breaking into the Legal Culture of the Victorian Office of Public Prosecutions’ in 
Lorana Bartels and Kelly Richards (eds), Qualitative Criminology: Stories from the Field (Haw-
kins Press, 2011) 47, 50–1. 
 16 VLRC, above n 2. 
 17 Ibid 8–11. 
 18 Ibid 12–13. See also DOJ, above n 10, 20–32. 
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edging that their use of lethal violence was disproportionate to the threat posed.19 
Writing in support of this recommendation, Tolmie believed that the benefits 
extended beyond those identified by the VLRC;20 she suggested that the pro-
posed partial defence would mean that ‘self-defence [would] no longer be an all-
or-nothing proposition’21 and thus that battered accused would be more likely to 
maintain their innocence rather than plead guilty pursuant to a plea bargain. 
Counter to the recommendation of the VLRC, the Victorian government 
implemented the offence of defensive homicide.22 Under s 9AD of the Crimes 
Act 1958 (Vic), defensive homicide is defined as occurring when ‘a person who, 
by his or her conduct, kills another person in circumstances that, but for 
section 9AC, would constitute murder’. The combined effect of ss 9AD and 9AC 
is that a person may now be convicted of defensive homicide (rather than the 
more serious offence of murder) where they killed with the belief that their 
actions were necessary in order to defend themselves, or another, but they had no 
reasonable grounds for that belief. The government argued that by implementing 
this offence, the jury and sentencing judges would be provided ‘with more 
options than the [current] “all or nothing” choice … between a murder 
conviction or acquittal’ in self-defence cases.23 Additionally, the government 
claimed that by creating a separate offence, rather than a partial defence, there 
would be greater consistency between juror verdicts and judicial sentencing.24 
Specifically, the alternate offence would mean that judges would not have to 
‘guess’ what factors led the jury to reach a manslaughter verdict; thus, with 
knowledge of these factors sentencing could better align with juror verdicts.25 
One of the key cases linked to the implementation of defensive homicide was 
the much debated murder conviction of Heather Osland in October 1996.26 
During the trial for the murder of her husband, Osland alleged that she had 
suffered from battered woman syndrome and had killed in self-defence after 
years of prolonged abuse; she cited that over 13 years, she had been the victim of 
repeated physical, emotional and sexual assaults.27 The jury, however, rejected 
this claim. Instead, they delivered a guilty verdict to murder. Osland was 
 
 19 VLRC, above n 2, 101–5. See also Marcia Neave, ‘Defences to Homicide: Final Report Launch’ 
(Speech delivered at the Launch of the VLRC Defences to Homicide: Final Report, Melbourne, 
18 November 2004) <http://www.lawreform.vic.gov.au/vlrc-voice/defences-homicide-final-
report-launch>. 
 20 VLRC, above n 2, 93–4. 
 21 Julia Tolmie, ‘Is the Partial Defence an Endangered Defence? Recent Proposals to Abolish 
Provocation’ [2005] New Zealand Law Review 25, 41. 
 22 The VLRC made no mention of ‘defensive homicide’ in its report. 
 23 DOJ, above n 10, 24. See also Office of the Attorney-General (Vic), ‘Hulls Announces Major 
Reform to Homicide Laws’ (Media Release, 4 October 2005). 
 24 DOJ, above n 10, 25. 
 25 Ibid. 
 26 Fergus Shiel, ‘End Draws Near for Defence of Provocation’, The Age (Melbourne), 5 October 
2005, 3. See further R v Osland [1998] 2 VR 636; Osland v The Queen (1998) 197 CLR 316. 
 27 R v Osland [1998] 2 VR 636, 641 (Winneke P, Hayne and Charles JJA). See also Debbie 
Kirkwood, ‘Access to Justice: Heather Osland’s Fight for Justice’ (2010) 35 Alternative Law 
Journal 168. 
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subsequently sentenced to a maximum 14.5 years imprisonment, with a non-
parole period of 9.5 years. 
In the wake of the Osland trial, and amidst growing concern that the law of 
homicide was inadequately responding to similar situations, it was posited that 
through the new offence of defensive homicide, and other reforms implemented 
to the law of self-defence, Victorian homicide law would better cater for, and 
understand, the unique context within which battered women kill. As then 
Attorney-General Rob Hulls explained, the new offence would mean that: 
Where a killing occurs in the context of family violence, the legislation will 
affirm that she can argue self-defence even if the threat from which she is 
defending herself is not immediate, and even where her response involved 
greater force than the harm with which she was threatened.28 
Hulls further clarified that the offence was not designed to provide a replace-
ment for the arguably failed provocation defence; rather, the new offence sought 
to better align homicide law with the contemporary expectations of the Victorian 
community.29 
Since its implementation, however, defensive homicide has operated in ways 
seemingly different to those envisioned by the government. Although predomi-
nantly established for persons who kill in response to prolonged family violence, 
to date, convictions for defensive homicide have been overwhelmingly obtained 
in cases involving male offenders, with only three female offenders receiving 
convictions for the offence (one from a trial and two from guilty pleas).30 
Consequently, and as identified by the DOJ, defensive homicide cases thus far 
have predominantly arisen from ‘one-off, violent, confrontation[s] between two 
males of approximately equal strength’,31 rather than from family violence. 
Principally, these cases have involved young male offenders with a history of 
drug addiction, clinically diagnosed forms of mental illness and/or prior convic-
tions for drug or violent offences.32 Furthermore, with the exception of one 
case,33 all defensive homicide victims have been male. 
IV  PL E A BA R G A I N I N G  I N  VI C TO R I A 
Plea bargaining refers to the discussions that occur between the prosecution 
and defence counsel regarding an accused person’s likely plea, and the possible 
negotiation of the charge(s), case facts, and/or the Crown’s sentencing submis-
sion. The primary aim of these discussions is to arrive at a consensual agreement, 
according to which the accused pleads guilty. Plea deals are generally made for 
utilitarian and emotion-based reasons: they save resource and financial expendi-
 
 28 Shiel, above n 26, 3 (quoting Rob Hulls). 
 29 Rob Hulls, ‘Fighting Family Violence May Require Further Reform’, The Sunday Age (Mel-
bourne), 30 May 2010, 21. 
 30 R v Black [2011] VSC 152 (12 April 2011); R v Creamer [2011] VSC 196 (20 April 2011); R v 
Edwards [2012] VSC 138 (24 April 2012). 
 31 DOJ, above n 10, 36. 
 32 Ibid 35–6. 
 33 R v Middendorp [2010] VSC 147 (1 March 2010). 
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ture, reduce court backlogs and prosecutorial workloads, and spare accused 
persons and victims from prolonged and often emotionally charged proceed-
ings.34 Due to these outcomes, much research considers plea bargaining to be a 
frequently used process: as McConville argues in the context of the UK, ‘plea 
bargaining [is] a widespread institutional practice and not isolated aberrational 
behaviour on the part of some maverick lawyers’.35 Similarly, based on her 
analysis of the origin and development of prosecutorial discretion in the United 
States (‘US’), Krauss observes that, ‘[t]oday, plea-bargaining and prosecutorial 
discretion determine the outcome of the vast majority of criminal cases.’36 
Estimates of the frequency of plea bargaining are often made using the 
assumption that because, on average, over two thirds of people plead guilty, plea 
bargains must provide some incentive for these pleas. Johns estimates that almost 
32 per cent of cases in NSW between 30 January 1998 and June 2001 were 
resolved by pre-trial plea bargains.37 The data provided by the Australian Bureau 
of Statistics for Australian higher courts in the period from 30 June 2010 to 30 
June 2011 indicates that 78 per cent, or 12 768 accused persons whose cases 
were adjudicated, were proven guilty.38 Of these, 88 per cent pleaded guilty. 
Using Johns’s estimates as a guide for analysis, this would mean that at least 
3584 of the 11 203 guilty pleas entered were due to pre-trial plea bargains. 
Despite anecdotally being considered a common method of case disposition in 
Victoria, no administrative data on plea bargaining exists. Plea bargaining is also 
not recognised in, or controlled by, any Victorian legislation. The only controls 
that can be indirectly applied to plea bargaining in Victorian statute are located in 
the Public Prosecutions Act 1994 (Vic) s 24(b), which alludes to plea bargaining 
by describing the importance of conducting ‘prosecutions in an effective, 
economic and efficient manner’, and in the Victim’s Charter Act 2006 (Vic) s 9, 
which imposes statutory requirements to inform victims of any alterations to 
charges. However, neither statute defines or acknowledges plea bargaining. 
The plea bargain agreement is to some extent subject to regulation by the 
courts. As part of a plea bargain, the prosecution and defence counsel determine 
an agreed summary of the case facts, which is then put to the court and forms the 
basis upon which the accused is sentenced. Given that a plea bargain will 
invariably reduce the accused’s culpability to some degree, this agreed summary 
may omit or minimise the relevance of factual elements of the crime in order to 
 
 34 Bishop, above n 7, 199; Flynn, ‘Victoria’s Legal Aid Funding Structure’, above n 7, 57; Seifman 
and Freiberg, above n 7, 66; JUSTICE, above n 7, 11; McConville, ‘Plea Bargaining’, above n 7, 
563. 
 35 Mike McConville, ‘Development of Empirical Techniques and Theory’ in Mike McConville and 
Wing Hong Chui (eds), Research Methods for Law (Edinburgh University Press, 2007) 207, 211. 
See also Bishop, above n 7, 204–6; Douglass, above n 7; Seifman and Freiberg, above n 7; 
McConville, ‘Plea Bargaining’, above n 7. 
 36 Rebecca Krauss, ‘The Theory of Prosecutorial Discretion in Federal Law: Origins and Develop-
ments’ (2009) 6 Seton Hall Circuit Review 1, 26. 
 37 Rowena Johns, ‘Victims of Crime: Plea Bargains, Compensation, Victim Impact Statements and 
Support Services’ (Briefing Paper No 10/02, NSW Parliamentary Library Research Service, June 
2002) 52. 
 38 Australian Bureau of Statistics, Criminal Courts, Australia 2010–11: Defendants Finalised, ABS 
Catalogue No 4513.0 (2012). 
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warrant a guilty plea to the altered charges. In R v Duong, the Victorian Court of 
Appeal stated that a judge is not bound to accept the version of facts agreed to by 
counsel as the sentencing basis if the facts are inconsistent with the evidence.39 
The regularity with which a court rejects the facts on this basis is difficult to 
ascertain, but of the participants interviewed, only two had personal experience 
of such a situation. Therefore, while there is some degree of judicial oversight 
over this aspect of the plea bargain agreement, it appears that in practice, this is 
not a process that is regularly used to verify the legitimacy of agreements. 
At present, the High Court case GAS v The Queen40 is arguably the leading 
case in relation to plea bargaining, as it loosely recognises the process by 
suggesting that both the prosecution and defence counsel should maintain written 
copies of any agreements that may have influenced a pleading decision, particu-
larly if these reasons might impact on the sentence later imposed.41 In this case, 
the lack of control and transparency surrounding prosecutorial decision-making 
in plea bargaining resulted in negative consequences for all parties, particularly 
the victim’s and accused person’s family. Both the plea bargain and the prosecu-
tor’s conduct were criticised because the victim’s family were not provided with 
accurate details of the agreement, or told there was any possibility that plea 
bargaining might occur, until shortly before the two accused pleaded guilty.42 
Following a Crown appeal on the manifest inadequacy of their sentences, the two 
accused persons also perceived themselves as ‘victims’ of the unscrutinised plea 
bargaining process, as they believed this appeal meant the prosecution had 
reneged on the initial agreement that had led to their guilty plea. The subsequent 
increase to their sentences by the Victorian Court of Appeal43 was thus perceived 
by the two accused to be unjust and non-reflective of their plea agreement. 
The lack of transparency surrounding the plea bargain in this case became a 
central focus of the defence appeal,44 which represented the first time where a 
court was required to specifically address issues related to counsel conduct in 
plea bargaining in Victoria. Upon hearing the appeal, the High Court stated that 
while there may be an understanding between counsel as to what evidence will 
 
 39 [1998] 4 VR 68, 77–8 (Kenny JA, Tadgell and Ormiston JJA agreeing). 
 40 (2004) 217 CLR 198. The case involved two offenders whose sexual and physical assault of a 
victim ultimately resulted in her death. Due to forensic difficulties in identifying the primary 
offender, the Crown entered into plea bargaining discussions with both of the accused. An 
agreement was then made whereby both offenders would plead guilty to manslaughter by an 
unlawful and dangerous act, on the provision that the Crown’s sentencing submission would state 
that they should be sentenced as aiders and abettors. This would mean that they would receive a 
lesser sentence than if they were charged as the principal offender. The accused were sentenced 
to six years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of four years: R v SJK [2002] VSC 94 
(3 April 2002) [60] (Bongiorno J). 
 41 GAS v The Queen (2004) 217 CLR 198, 214 [42]–[43] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne and 
Heydon JJ). 
 42 See, eg, Elissa Hunt and Ashley Gardiner, ‘Justice for Our Gran: Get Tough on Young Killers, 
Family Urges’, Herald Sun (Melbourne), 5 April 2002, 1. 
 43 DPP (Vic) v SJK [2002] VSCA 131 (26 August 2002) [70] (Phillips CJ, Chernov and Vin-
cent JJA). In hearing the appeal, the Court increased both sentences to nine years’ imprisonment, 
with a non-parole period of six years. 
 44 GAS v The Queen (2004) 217 CLR 198, 210–14 [27]–[41] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne 
and Heydon JJ). 
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be provided or what sentencing or legal submissions will be made, this does not 
bind the judge in determining the sentence, other than in the practical sense that 
the judge may be limited to the agreed summary of facts presented by counsel.45 
The Court also noted that any agreement made between counsel ‘which may 
later be said to be relevant to the defendant’s decision to plead guilty’ should be 
recorded in writing, with copies maintained by both parties.46 The Court sug-
gested that: 
Recording what is agreed, in an agreed form of words, should reduce the scope 
for misunderstanding what is to be, or has been, agreed. … There should then 
be far less room for subsequent debate about the basis on which an accused per-
son chose to enter a plea of guilty.47 
In making this statement, the Court provided some recognition of plea bargain-
ing and the negative consequences that can potentially arise from a lack of 
formality in agreements. However, the significance and influence of this 
statement is somewhat limited, given that the Court did not propose or require 
any regulations or scrutiny be applied to plea bargaining despite being given the 
opportunity to do so. 
The fact that these comments made in 2004 were the first and remain the only 
instance of a legal authority acknowledging plea bargaining in Victoria or 
attempting to provide transparency to the process demonstrates a significant gap 
in Victorian legal policy. This gap is concerning not only because it undermines 
the ideals of public and open justice,48 but also because of the negative implica-
tions that can potentially result from an unscrutinised agreement (as demon-
strated by GAS v The Queen). 
Within the OPP, internal and non-legally binding guidance on plea bargaining 
is detailed within two director’s policies49 and one practice guide.50 Within these 
documents, prosecutors are encouraged to initiate discussions, regardless of 
whether the defence approaches them, and to refrain from offering deals to 
unrepresented accused persons. The policies also contain information regarding 
what the prosecution should consider when deciding how to proceed with a case; 
for example, one policy states that the likely outcome of a trial, in terms of 
upholding victim and community interests, should be compared with that of a 
negotiated guilty plea.51 
While providing some guidance for prosecutors, the influence of these infor-
mal, non-legally binding policies in controlling prosecutorial conduct, or 
monitoring any deviation, is minimal. This is because although director’s 
policies are considered ‘official policies’, insofar as they should be upheld 
 
 45 Ibid 211. 
 46 Ibid 214. 
 47 Ibid 214–15. 
 48 See, eg, the right to a fair hearing in Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 
(Vic) s 24(1). 
 49 OPP, Policy 9 — Director’s Policy as to the Role of the Crown upon Plea and Sentence (2012); 
OPP, Policy 22 — Director’s Policy as to the Early Resolution of Cases (2012). 
 50 OPP, Policy 2 — The Prosecutorial Discretion (2008). 
 51 See, eg, OPP, Policy 22, above n 49, cls 22.5–22.9. 
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whenever possible, there are no penalties applied for deviation from them. 
Further, no mechanisms exist to monitor whether the requirements of the policies 
are followed. The lack of scrutiny surrounding the OPP internal policies is 
perhaps even more evident in relation to the practice guide, which is considered 
to be ‘less official’ than the director’s policies. The only scrutiny applied to the 
practice guide is a suggestion from the Director of Public Prosecutions (‘DPP’) 
that prosecutors avoid deviating from them whenever possible.52 Thus, as 
evident in the comments of Defence E (PA), prosecutorial adherence to the 
OPP’s policies relies upon ‘trusting’ the Crown: ‘we have to put some degree of 
faith in legal counsel to do their job in that regard’. 
The policies also provide very little transparency to the public when plea 
bargaining occurs; thus, regardless of whether or not any misconduct transpires, 
doubt is created over the legitimacy of any plea deals made. As a result, criminal 
cases in Victoria, including those involving the most serious homicide offences, 
appear to be resolved on the basis of unscrutinised decisions in a largely unregu-
lated and non-transparent process. 
V  PR O B L E M S  W I T H  PL E A BA R G A I N I N G  I N  VI C TO R I A 
The secrecy surrounding plea bargaining fuels a number of concerns regarding 
the ‘just’ nature of plea agreements and their potentially negative impact on the 
parties most affected by them. In particular, concerns arise in relation to the 
potential pressures that plea bargaining can create, which may compel accused 
persons to plead guilty. While some form of pleading pressure would likely exist 
in a transparent plea bargaining system simply due to the benefits of a plea deal 
(for example, conviction on a reduced charge and/or lower sentence), this 
pressure becomes more concerning in Victoria due to the absence of scrutiny or 
transparency applied to the process, the prosecutor’s decision, and the agree-
ment. This is because an absence of transparency reduces one’s ability to test the 
‘justness’ of the outcome and the motivations of the accused in pleading guilty, 
which leads to the distinct possibility that an accused person may plead guilty to 
an offence they did not commit.53 This concern is highlighted in McConville and 
Mirsky’s analysis of plea bargaining in the UK, where they asserted that: 
the guilty plea system transforms criminal justice from one which seeks to 
determine whether the state has reliably sustained its burden of proof to another 
which seeks to determine whether the defendant, irrespective of guilt or 
innocence, is able to resist the pressure to plead guilty.54 
Pleading pressures arise from a multitude of factors. One such factor is the 
general financial constraints of a trial, which may appear particularly onerous 
when contrasted with the benefits that can be obtained from plea bargaining. For 
 
 52 As stated by Prosecutor N (PA). 
 53 John Baldwin and Michael McConville, Negotiated Justice: Pressures to Plead Guilty (Martin 
Robertson, 1977) ch 4. 
 54 Mike McConville and Chester L Mirsky, Jury Trials and Plea Bargaining: A True History (Hart 
Publishing, 2005) vi. 
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example, plea bargaining can result in a conviction for a less serious offence and 
a reduction in the sentence length and/or type.55 These benefits can effectively 
force an accused person to accept a plea agreement in order to forgo the high 
costs associated with going to trial. This environment of pressure was identified 
by Defence C (PA), who explained that: 
Some defendants just can’t face the thought of going to a contested hearing 
because of the stress and emotional trauma. More significantly though, most 
can’t afford the cost … So there is a fair bit of pressure on them just to plead 
guilty, especially when it is sweetened with a bargain. 
A related concern, which is more pressing in an unscrutinised plea bargaining 
process, is the potential for the accused to initially be ‘overcharged’ (whether 
that involves more offences, or more serious offences, or a combination of both) 
in order to strongly encourage them to plead guilty to a ‘bargained’ version of 
these charges. Freedman defines overcharging as the situation in which a 
prosecuting agency charges an accused with ‘a more serious offense or an 
accumulation of offenses’, which creates a strong incentive for the accused to 
enter into plea bargaining.56 As a consequence, ‘bluff and tactics — rather than 
truth, justice, guilt or innocence’57 — guide the bargaining process, with offers 
made to the accused often being ‘hollow’ compromises of charges that would be 
unlikely to stand up to the rules of evidence applied at trial. 
The possibility of the prosecution using overcharging as a negotiation tactic 
was explored with the participants in Project A. While 29 participants acknowl-
edged that overcharging does occur, they attributed this not to deviousness of the 
prosecution, but rather to the inexperience or the overzealousness of the police. 
As explained by Defence A (PA): 
The fact that someone gets charged with 160 offences, when they should be 
charged with two, yes that happens … In many instances, it is the inexperience 
of the police that causes it. … They charge with everything, so you end up with 
a whole heap of charges that probably shouldn’t be there. 
Observing the existence of ‘cautious’ charging practices, Prosecutor B (PA) 
argued that ‘police usually charge people with a whole range of offences that 
they think are appropriate, but it is not a question of overcharging, it is so we can 
work out what the best charge is’. This view was supported by Judiciary A (PA), 
who maintained that overcharging was not ‘a fundamentally cynical exercise’, 
but rather was used as ‘a practical way of whittling away the husks and then you 
get into the core’. 
Although the majority perspective did not support the notion that overcharging 
is a prominent concern (only eight participants recognised it as a limitation of 
plea bargaining), the lack of scrutiny surrounding prosecutorial discretion in 
 
 55 Defence A (PA). See also Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) s 6AAA, which governs sentence discounts 
for guilty pleas. 
 56 Monroe H Freedman, Lawyers’ Ethics in an Adversary System (Bobbs-Merrill, 1975) 88. See 
also Douglass, above n 7, 277. 
 57 Mike McConville, Andrew Sanders and Roger Leng, The Case for the Prosecution (Routledge, 
1991) 166. 
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making charging decisions can still impact on a perception of (in)justice. 
Prosecutor I (PA) surmised: 
It is sometimes viewed as all these charges have been put in as a way of trying 
to make them plead to something, but it is really driven from the proposition 
that if we had to run a trial, we have to have individual counts. So you might 
end up with more counts than the case could settle for, but you do not really 
have any other way of doing it when you run a trial. But the problem is that you 
can’t really explain this and it can lead to that perception that the police over-
charge and we use this to our advantage. 
A similar concern was identified by Defence E (PA), one of the eight partici-
pants who expressed the opinion that overcharging can compel an accused to 
plead guilty:  
Because the police already charge with every possible charge, prosecutors can 
use that as some kind of bargaining device to get rid of some charges, without 
really affecting their case. So overcharging, the hamburger with the lot, is a real 
problem, especially as there is no real way to track it and they can always just 
say ‘well we don’t know what we are going to proceed with at this stage if it 
goes to trial’. 
The implications of pleading pressures and overcharging existing in an unscru-
tinised plea bargaining process increase in seriousness in light of the number of 
vulnerable people who come before the law. As Prosecutor H (PA) identified, ‘in 
the justice system, you are often dealing with people who have substance abuse 
problems or psychological or psychiatric problems’. This concern was also 
considered in Stubbs and Tolmie’s analysis of 55 Australian cases involving 
battered women charged with homicide offences from 1991 to 2007. They found 
that women using battered woman syndrome as a defence were under immense 
pressure to plead guilty to any plea bargain offers, due to factors such as 
the problematic nature of [battered woman syndrome] evidence that can 
undermine a self-defence case, the uncertainty of the law on self-defence as 
applied to these situations, a lack of appellate decisions giving clear guidance in 
this respect, the trauma involved for the accused in having the details recounted 
publicly, possibly in the presence of the deceased’s family and any children, 
and the potential trauma to her children if they are needed to testify.58 
A similar view was expressed in Miller’s examination of battered women who 
use force in response to partner violence in the US, where she claimed that such 
women were more likely to accept a plea bargain ‘without regard for their guilt 
or innocence but in relation to their fears of jail or losing custody of their 
children.’59 
 
 58 Julie Stubbs and Julia Tolmie, ‘Battered Women Charged with Homicide: Advancing the 
Interests of Indigenous Women’ (2008) 41 Australian and New Zealand Journal of Criminology 
138, 149–50. 
 59 Susan L Miller, Victims as Offenders: The Paradox of Women’s Violence in Relationships 
(Rutgers University Press, 2005) 137. 
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Of most importance in the context of this article, Stubbs and Tolmie found that 
the pressures on battered women to plead guilty were exacerbated by the 
‘opaque’ nature of plea bargaining, because the process 
shifts the determination of guilt from the judicial to the prosecutorial realm, to 
be negotiated in private between the defence and the prosecution. The process 
is not overseen by a judge, and there are no jurors to inject community values 
into the decision-making. There is no way to identify or challenge misconcep-
tions about domestic violence, or other factors, that may shape the decisions 
and little chance for the public to learn how a decision was reached.60 
This concern touches on perhaps the central problem surrounding plea bargain-
ing in Victoria: that it undermines the established principle of public and open 
justice — justice should be seen to be done, and the public should have access to 
criminal proceedings except under exceptional circumstances.61 Public and open 
justice is a central requirement of the criminal justice system because it enhances 
victim, accused persons’ and public understandings of the needs and aims of the 
system, while also providing some accountability to proceedings and the conduct 
of those who operate within them.62 In this manner, public and open justice can 
also provide a mechanism to increase public confidence in the criminal justice 
system more generally.63 Furthermore, this principle has been acknowledged in 
case law, statute and international covenants since the early 20th century as ‘a 
sound and very sacred part of the constitution of the country and the administra-
tion of justice’.64 
The link between public confidence and transparency was explored in a 1997 
report produced by the Victorian Community Council Against Violence.65 In this 
report, the Council found that a lack of accessible information on ‘why certain 
charges were not laid or why the seriousness of a charge was reduced’66 signifi-
cantly contributed to low public confidence in the justice system. In particular, 
they found that public perceptions of plea bargaining were predominantly 
negative due to the lack of accessible information about how plea bargaining 
happens, who is involved and the basis for negotiation.67 A 2007 Victorian 
Sentencing Advisory Council report examining specified sentence discounts and 
sentence indications found similar perspectives among the participants, who 
 
 60 Stubbs and Tolmie, above n 58, 149. 
 61 For example, the court may be closed to public viewing when a protected witness is testifying: 
see Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic) s 24(2). 
 62 Flynn, ‘Non-Transparent Justice’, above n 7, 91. 
 63 Mike Hough and Alison Park, ‘How Malleable Are Attitudes to Crime and Punishment? Findings 
from a British Deliberative Poll’ in Julian V Roberts and Mike Hough (eds), Changing Attitudes 
to Punishment: Public Opinion, Crime and Justice (Willan, 2002) 163, 163–5. 
 64 Scott v Scott [1913] AC 417, 473 (Lord Shaw). See also Charter of Human Rights and 
Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic) s 24(1); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
opened for signature 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976) 
art 14; Webb v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 41, 51–2 (Mason CJ and McHugh J). 
 65 Victorian Community Council Against Violence, Community Knowledge and Perceptions of 
Sentencing in Victoria: A Report on the Findings of the Consultations (1997). 
 66 Ibid 63. 
 67 Ibid 52–4. 
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were drawn from the broader Victorian community.68 In particular, the report 
found that the participants defined plea bargaining as a deal made to induce 
accused persons to plead guilty, often at the victim’s expense.69 Specifically, the 
Council found that a common misperception was that Victorian plea bargaining 
practices emulated the dramatised US systems (mis)represented on television, in 
which accused persons make deals that include specified sentences and often do 
not reflect the level of their criminality.70 While the Council acknowledged the 
potential for such deals to occur in some international jurisdictions, it maintained 
that ‘the fear that such an agreement could be struck here is based on a misun-
derstanding of the roles of the parties in the Victorian criminal justice system, 
particularly the role and power of the prosecution.’71 Such misapprehensions are 
particularly problematic following the implementation of the Victorian homicide 
law reforms, given that an understanding of the true operation of the law is 
essential to gauge the reforms’ success and initial effect. These misapprehensions 
are also concerning given the volume of plea deals that have been made since 
defensive homicide was introduced. 
VI  AD VA N TA G E S  A N D  DI S A D VA N TA G E S  O F  PL E A BA R G A I N S  I N  T H E  
DE F E N S I V E  HO M I C I D E  CO N T E X T 
In order to allow a plea of guilty to defensive homicide, the Crown must 
consent to the withdrawal of any additional homicide-related charges. This is 
because the offence is not used as a sole charge; rather, it is applied as an 
alternative charge to murder. When a trial occurs, it is the jury who are tasked 
with this decision. They must first assess the level of the accused’s culpability, 
based on the factors outlined in s 9AD of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic), and, 
following this, they must decide whether to find the accused guilty of murder or 
the lesser charge of defensive homicide (or any other possibilities that may be 
outlined by the judge). Because the decision to enter a guilty plea is made by the 
prosecution and the accused, the public is left simply to trust that these parties 
have upheld the same judicial principles which would apply to a trial. 
In commenting on whether the volume of plea bargains occurring in defensive 
homicide cases was a strength or weakness of the operation of the new offence, 
the majority of participants interviewed in Project B supported the use of plea 
bargains, primarily due to the potential benefits of an early guilty plea. As 
Defence C (PB) commented, ‘I think that [defensive homicide] has been a very 
good introduction, and already people are kind of pleading to that and … that’s a 
part of the compromise process and that’s worked well’. In a similar vein, 
Prosecutor H (PB) described the use of plea bargaining in defensive homicide 
cases as being ‘good for the community, good for the court system, … [and] 
 
 68 Sentencing Advisory Council (Vic), Sentence Indication and Specified Sentence Discounts: Final 
Report (2007). 
 69 Ibid 67. 
 70 Ibid 71–2. 
 71 Ibid 72. 
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good for the victim, and if the accused is satisfied with the outcome, everybody’s 
a winner’. 
Such comments are not unusual when exploring the possible justifications and 
advantages of plea bargaining, especially given the resource pressures facing 
those involved in the court system.72 In fact, reducing court backlogs by increas-
ing clearance rates and saving victims and accused persons from drawn-out 
proceedings were consistently offered as the primary justifications for plea 
bargaining by participants in both projects. As Prosecutor M (PA) explained, 
‘there are the practical benefits of not only costs saved in terms of emotional and 
psychological [costs], but also the costs in terms of financial costs, which can be 
extreme’. Defence C (PA) similarly noted that, ‘from a defence point of view, 
[plea bargaining] saves money and anxiety on the part of the defendant. From the 
victim’s point of view, it saves anxiety from them having to give evidence, and it 
saves a significant backlog of cases in the system and reduces delay’. 
Importantly, one of the main potential benefits identified, particularly by those 
participants from the prosecution sample, was that plea bargaining offered a 
guaranteed conviction. Participants perceived this benefit as equating with public 
interests being upheld because the accused was ultimately held accountable, at 
some level, for his or her conduct. This perception supports McConville and 
Baldwin’s analysis of plea bargaining in the UK, which found that it is ‘in the 
public interest that those who are indeed guilty should admit their guilt’.73 
The public benefit of obtaining convictions through plea bargaining is, how-
ever, questionable, and depends upon how ‘upholding interests’ is defined. This 
is particularly so because the conviction recorded as part of a plea deal is not 
necessarily reflective of the full extent of an accused person’s culpability or of 
the crimes they have committed. As Defence F (PB) explained: 
It has probably saved the community a lot of money because a lot of people 
have pleaded to defensive homicide — they’ve settled. But then, with that, you 
have to look at the issue of expediency, [that it comes at] the expense of justice. 
‘It’s quicker and cheaper, so let’s not worry about justice.’ 
The perceived ‘benefit’ to the public from obtaining convictions through plea 
bargaining is also questionable due to the sentence discount often applied in 
exchange for a guilty plea. Statute and case law establish that this discount is 
applied primarily based on the timing at which a plea was entered.74 This process 
is thus utilitarian in that it values a guilty plea whether or not such a plea is 
indicative of an accused person’s remorse. Consequently, ‘the operation of the 
 
 72 See Janet Chan and Lynne Barnes, The Price of Justice? Lengthy Criminal Trials in Australia 
(Hawkins Press, 1995); Flynn, ‘Victoria’s Legal Aid Funding Structure’, above n 7, 59; Jason 
Payne, ‘Criminal Trial Delays in Australia: Trial Listing Outcomes’ (Research and Public Policy 
Series No 74, Australian Institute of Criminology, 2007). 
 73 Michael McConville and John Baldwin, Courts, Prosecution and Conviction (Oxford University 
Press, 1981) 66. 
 74 See, eg, Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) s 5(2)(e) (requiring a judge to consider ‘whether the offender 
pleaded guilty to the offence and, if so, the stage in the proceedings at which the offender did so 
or indicated an intention to do so’); Cameron v The Queen (2002) 209 CLR 339. 
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discount system has … little to do with justice; it exists primarily because of 
administrative expediency.’75 
The guilty plea discount has been an object of significant criticism, particularly 
when that plea is entered after a plea agreement has been reached.76 This is 
primarily because if an accused pleaded guilty as part of a plea bargain and, in 
addition, received a sentence discount, they are effectively rewarded twice. Such 
a result is significant because in most plea bargains, while the efficiency benefits 
of the guilty plea may still be present, the accused has already received certain 
leniencies in their charges and/or case facts.77 
Concerns surrounding the application of a sentence discount are of particular 
relevance to defensive homicide cases, where an examination of the sentences 
imposed thus far illustrates that those who have pleaded guilty have received, on 
average, a two year reduction.78 Such discounts have typically been justified on 
the basis of the pragmatic benefits of a plea. For example, in sentencing Benja-
min Wilson in 2009, the judge noted that the accused had ‘saved the community 
the cost of a trial and the witnesses the ordeal of one.’79 This reasoning is 
mirrored in the sentencing comments for Karen Black in April 2011, where the 
judge specified that the accused’s guilty plea had ‘served the interests of justice 
[and] saved the community the costs of a trial’.80 
Despite these benefits, the fact that the accused receives both a plea deal and a 
sentence discount raises some concern as to whether justice is achieved and 
whether the seriousness of the offence is adequately recognised, particularly in 
light of sentences in defensive homicide cases, which have tended to fall well 
below the maximum penalty set by Parliament.81 As a level 3 penalty offence, 
defensive homicide can attract a maximum penalty of 20 years’ imprisonment.82 
Between 1 November 2005 and 30 April 2012, however, the maximum sentences 
imposed in defensive homicide cases have ranged between 6 and 12 years’ 
imprisonment, with the average maximum sentence being roughly 9 years’ 
imprisonment. The imposition of sentences far below the maximum penalty has 
led to criticisms of the new offence.83 As one observer argued: ‘Plead defensive 
homicide and you will get a really low sentence. It is not justice.’84 
Participants in Project A also identified the public view of a ‘double benefit’ as 
a common criticism of the application of a sentence discount after plea bargain-
ing: as Judiciary G (PA) noted, ‘the public view is that sentences are being 
 
 75 Baldwin and McConville, Negotiated Justice, above n 53, 109. 
 76 See, eg, ibid; Bishop, above n 7, 184; McConville and Mirsky, above n 54, 1–14. 
 77 See Andrew Ashworth, The Criminal Process: An Evaluative Study (Clarendon Press, 1994) 
266–70; Baldwin and McConville, Negotiated Justice, above n 53, 106–9. 
 78 DOJ, above n 10, 35. 
 79 R v Wilson [2009] VSC 431 (21 September 2009) [43] (Curtain J). 
 80 R v Black [2011] VSC 152 (12 April 2011) [24] (Curtain J). 
 81 See Table 1 in below Part VII. 
 82 Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 9AD. See also Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) s 109. 
 83 Shaye Beck, ‘Family Defeated Again’, Herald Sun (Melbourne), 20 May 2010, 21; Georgie 
Pilcher, ‘Psychotic Killer Out in Two Years’, Herald Sun (Melbourne), 16 October 2008, 4. 
 84 Pilcher, above n 83, 4 (quoting Nicole Plowman). 
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reduced by too much, because defendants are pleading to secret deals, and the 
result is the public loses confidence in the system’. In light of these public 
interest concerns and the criticisms surrounding the sentences imposed in 
defensive homicide cases more generally, the double benefit provides a further 
justification for increasing the transparency of plea bargaining. The double 
benefit also provides justification to increase the transparency surrounding the 
prosecutor’s discretion in accepting the guilty plea because this decision has an 
increased level of significance at the sentencing stage. 
VII   LA C K  O F  TR A N S PA R E N C Y I N  DE F E N S I V E  HO M I C I D E  CA S E S 
A  The Need for Transparency 
In our view there is also a need — particularly in the case of charges as serious 
as murder or manslaughter — for better accountability and transparency in the 
plea negotiation process. … We hope this may promote greater public 
confidence in how these matters are dealt with, and a better understanding of 
the basis upon which these important decisions are made.85 
The private nature of plea bargaining in Victoria makes it extremely difficult to 
determine the effects of the implementation of defensive homicide. This is 
particularly so in relation to understanding how or why prosecutorial decisions 
are made and whether the offence is working effectively and as intended in 
practice. The importance of understanding the workability of defensive homi-
cide, and its effect more broadly upon the criminal justice system, was high-
lighted during the initial implementation of the homicide law reforms in 2005. 
The government described the changes as ‘the most significant reforms to 
homicide laws since the death penalty was abolished 30 years ago’.86 However, 
without a transparent plea bargaining system it becomes difficult, if not impossi-
ble, to examine the operation of this offence in any significant quantitative or 
qualitative manner. Thus, in line with recommendations of the VLRC,87 this 
article contends that there is a need for greater transparency in plea bargaining. 
Discussions over the restriction of prosecutorial discretion have been a com-
mon feature of legal research over the past several decades.88 Indeed, much of 
the literature supporting plea bargaining’s legal recognition and/or the curbing of 
 
 85 VLRC, above n 2, 110. 
 86 Office of the Attorney-General (Vic), above n 23. 
 87 VLRC, above n 2, 110 (recommendations 11–12). 
 88 See, eg, Katja Franko Aas, Sentencing in the Age of Information: From Faust to Macintosh 
(Glasshouse Press, 2005) ch 1; Abraham S Blumberg, Criminal Justice (Quadrangle Books, 
1970) 3–12; Roger Cotterrell, ‘Law in Social Theory and Social Theory in the Study of Law’ in 
Austin Sarat (ed), The Blackwell Companion to Law and Society (Blackwell, 2004) 15, 21; 
Kenneth Culp Davis, Discretionary Justice: A Preliminary Inquiry (Louisiana State University 
Press, 1969); David Dixon, Law in Policing: Legal Regulation and Police Practices (Clarendon 
Press, 1997) ch 7; Oonagh E Fitzgerald, The Guilty Plea and Summary Justice: A Guide for 
Practitioners (Carswell, 1990) ch 7; Robert A Kagan, ‘Regulators and Regulatory Processes’ in 
Austin Sarat (ed), The Blackwell Companion to Law and Society (Blackwell, 2004) 212; Cyrus 
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prosecutorial discretion within this process maintains that statutory acknowl-
edgement is essential if plea bargaining is to be used to resolve cases. Statutory 
recognition of plea bargaining would increase transparency and thereby enhance 
its accountability to the public.89 As Littrell argues, ‘what is required is that plea 
bargaining be reformed by raising the visibility of the process, introducing 
proper supervision and structuring the making of administrative decisions in 
it’.90 Temby similarly claims: 
There seems to be every reason why discussions between prosecutor and 
defence counsel as to the perceived strength of the prosecution case should be 
encouraged. To the extent that [this] leads to matters being disposed of 
following a guilty plea, without derogating from the need to see appropriate 
convictions obtained and sentences imposed, that is surely a good thing.91 
In the late 1960s, Davis asked: ‘why should the prosecutor’s charging decision 
be immune to review by other officials and immune to review by the courts, even 
though our legal and governmental system elsewhere generally assumes the need 
for checking human frailty?’92 When asked to respond to this question in the 
context of Victoria’s plea bargaining process, an emerging theme in participant 
perspectives was that retaining an absence of control over prosecutorial discre-
tion was necessary to facilitate reasonable outcomes and to consider the individ-
ual circumstances of each case. However, problems arise from this ideal because 
without some uniformity, the prosecutor’s flexible, unscrutinised powers have 
the potential to be abused or, perhaps as significantly, to create a perception of 
abuse, which can negatively impact upon public confidence in the criminal 
justice process.93 As Bibas rightly observes, ‘discretion is bad only when it 
becomes idiosyncratic, unaccountable, or opaque’;94 these are all terms that 
could be used to describe Victoria’s current system of plea bargaining. 
Without transparency, prosecutors can effectively be viewed as ‘the key gate-
keepers who ration criminal justice’,95 as their discretionary powers allow them 
to play a more prominent and significant role in the delivery of modern justice 
than the traditional involvement of the community in a jury trial. As a result, the 
 
 89 Paul Byrne, ‘Criminal Law and Justice’ (1988) 62 Australian Law Journal 799, 801–3; Chan and 
Barnes, above n 72, 56–60; Peter Clark, ‘The Public Prosecutor and Plea Bargaining’ (1986) 60 
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nal Trial Reform Conference, Melbourne, 24 March 2000) <http://www.aija.org.au/ctr/ 
TEMBY.pdf >; J R Sulan, ‘Defence Co-Operation in the Trial Process’ (Speech delivered at the 
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jury, and hence community input, is largely silenced. Lynch refers to this power 
as ‘prosecutorial adjudication’,96 a process in which the prosecutor 
serves as the central adjudicator of facts (as well as replacing the judge as arbi-
ter of most legal issues[)] … evaluates culpability and chooses the charge for 
which he will accept a guilty plea … [and offers] an ‘advisory’ sentencing 
guideline … [resulting in] the exercise of prosecutorial discretion affect[ing] 
almost every step of the criminal justice process, from charging to sentencing.97 
The need for community input in decisions relating to convictions is particu-
larly relevant to debates surrounding defensive homicide. This can be seen from 
research that has examined the roles of both the jury and community input in 
relation to the now abolished partial defence of provocation.98 As Judiciary H 
(PB) maintained, ‘juries are a good barometer for what the community thinks 
about these things.’ In a similar vein, Defence J (PB) claimed that jury verdicts 
are ‘the one area … where the community has a real input into who it wants to 
call a murderer.’ As the opportunity for community input through jury trials in 
defensive homicide cases has been minimised by the high rate of guilty pleas, it 
is essential that there is greater transparency in the process of attaining such 
pleas. 
Greater transparency is also of relevance given that, prior to the implementa-
tion of defensive homicide, a key concern in the operation of the partial defence 
of provocation was that men were effectively getting away with a conviction less 
than murder.99 This concern underpinned the 2005 homicide law reforms, 
particularly the abolition of the partial defence of provocation and the introduc-
tion of a new offence more specifically designed to cater for women who kill in 
response to prolonged family violence, rather than to provide an avenue of 
excuse for men who kill. Over six years into the operation of defensive homi-
cide, it is unclear, largely because of the dominant use of unscrutinised plea 
deals, whether this alternate category of homicide is having the same effect as 
did provocation in diminishing the seriousness of lethal violence committed by 
men.100 
Transparency is also important because prosecutors may be motivated by 
efficiency101 rather than justice considerations when accepting guilty pleas. 
Court delays and resource inadequacies have consistently been identified as 
significant problems confronting Australian criminal jurisdictions since the 
 
 96 Gerard E Lynch, ‘Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice’ (1998) 66 Fordham Law 
Review 2117, 2141. 
 97 Krauss, above n 36, 8–9. 
 98 Joshua Dressler, ‘Why Keep the Provocation Defense?: Some Reflections on a Difficult Subject’ 
(2001) 86 Minnesota Law Review 959. 
 99 VLRC, above n 2, 27–30. 
100 Within the context of defensive homicide this refers to lethal violence perpetrated upon both 
male and female victims. 
101 The DPP must have regard to ‘the need to conduct prosecutions in an effective, economic and 
efficient manner’ under Public Prosecutions Act 1994 (Vic) s 24(b). 
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1980s, leading to pressures being placed on prosecutors to clear the court lists.102 
The extent of delays in Victoria was commented upon by participants in Pro-
ject A, who cited delays of over a year from committal to trial.103 Prosecutor V 
(PA) maintained that these delays created ‘pressure from the courts to resolve 
cases as quickly as we can’. Prosecutor I (PA) similarly claimed that ‘there is 
always pressure. Too many cases, not enough resources, budgetary cuts from 
above … As well as the fact that if we can get a nice plea bargain, rather than run 
a two-day trial, there is incentive just from a work viewpoint’. 
While participants stated that these efficiency pressures were ‘not that great’ 
(Prosecutor C (PA)) and ‘appropriate and acceptable’ (Judiciary F (PA)), a 
concern remains that in the absence of any transparency surrounding prosecuto-
rial discretion, plea bargaining could result in unjust or inappropriate outcomes 
due to efficiency pressures. The potential for plea bargaining decisions to be 
based on idiosyncratic reasoning, such as the desire to clear workloads, means 
that the community may, as Bibas argues, ‘rightly fear that justice will vary from 
prosecutor to prosecutor, with each one a law unto himself and his own whims, 
biases, and shirking.’104 The potential for such problems was anticipated by the 
VLRC in its 2004 report: 
One of the dangers of plea negotiations is seen to be that they shift decisions 
about guilt and criminal responsibility from the public realm of courts and 
juries, to the private realm of prosecutorial and police discretion. … It can be 
argued that, at the very least, there is an important public interest in proper 
records being kept of these negotiations to allow the basis on which these 
decisions are made to be better understood.105 
As highlighted by Bibas and the VLRC, the need to redress the concern sur-
rounding unscrutinised prosecutorial discretion provides further justification for 
greater transparency of plea bargaining, particularly if the process continues to 
be used as the predominant resolution method in cases of defensive homicide. 
B  Analysis of Defensive Homicide Cases 
As discussed, in the majority of cases in which the Crown has accepted a 
guilty plea to defensive homicide, the circumstances of the offence have 
involved a young male victim and accused perceived to be of similar strength, 
 
102 See, eg, Access to Justice Advisory Committee, Access to Justice: An Action Plan (1994) 420–30 
(‘Sackville Report’); Bishop, above n 7, 4–5; Chan and Barnes, above n 72, 1–12; Payne, above 
n 72, 8–10; Weatherburn and Baker, above n 89, 6. See generally Paul Coghlan, ‘Committal: 
Post Committal’ (Speech delivered at the Australasian Institute of Judicial Administration: 
Criminal Trial Reform Conference, Melbourne, 24 March 2000) <http://www.aija.org.au/ctr/ 
COGHLAN.pdf >. 
103 Prosecutor D (PA) stated that ‘the delays on trials have blown out … For a short trial, you are 
looking at at least a 12 month waiting period before it will get up and for a long trial, not until 
the following year’. Judiciary B (PA) similarly maintained that ‘delays are a real problem … 
There is an average 13 month delay from the committal [hearing] to trial … There are [also] 
delays in issues involving forensic analysis, which can involve between ten months and one 
year’. 
104 Bibas, above n 94, 371. 
105 VLRC, above n 2, 108. 
     
926 Melbourne University Law Review  [Vol 35 
 
     
and the death has resulted after a single violent altercation.106 Table 1 provides a 
closer analysis of the circumstances of each defensive homicide case in which 
the Crown has accepted a guilty plea. 
Table 1: Defensive Homicide Convictions Resulting from the Crown’s 
Acceptance of a Guilty Plea (1 November 2005 – 30 April 2012) 
Case Event that  
induced fear 
Sentence max/min 
R v Smith [2008] VSC 87  
(1 April 2008) Violence 
7 years/ 
5 years 6 months 
R v Edwards [2008] VSC 
297 (13 August 2008) 
Verbal exchange 
including threat of 
violence 
10 years/8 years 
R v Giammona [2008] VSC 
376 (26 September 2008) Violence 8 years/6 years 
R v Smith [2008] VSC 617 
(15 October 2008) Unclear 
7 years/ 
4 years 6 months 
R v Taiba [2008] VSC 589 
(23 December 2008) Unclear 9 years/7 years 
R v Baxter [2009] VSC 178 
(12 May 2009) Violence 
8 years 6 months/ 
5 years 6 months 
R v Trezise [2009] VSC 520 
(31 August 2009) Unclear 8 years/4 years 
R v Spark [2009] VSC 374 
(11 September 2009) Verbal exchange 
7 years/ 
4 years 9 months 
R v Wilson [2009] VSC 431 
(21 September 2009) Violence 10 years/7 years 
R v Evans [2009] VSC 593 
(16 December 2009) Violence 10 years/7 years 
 
106 See above Part III; DOJ, above n 10, 33–40. 
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R v Black [2011] VSC 152 
(12 April 2011) Verbal exchange 9 years/6 years 
R v Ghazlan [2011] VSC 
178 (3 May 2011) Violence 
10 years 6 months/ 
7 years 6 months 
R v Martin [2011] VSC 217 
(20 May 2011) Sexual assault 8 years/5 years 
R v Jewell [2011] VSC 483 
(27 September 2011) Verbal exchange 8 years/5 years 
R v Monks [2011] VSC 626 
(2 December 2011) Violence 8 years/5 years 
R v Edwards [2012] VSC 
138 (24 April 2012) Violence 
7 years/ 
4 years 9 months 
 
Table 1 shows that in nine of the 16 cases, the basis for the accused’s fear of 
death or really serious injury was an incident of actual violence committed by the 
victim. In four of the 16 cases, the basis for the accused’s fear was a verbal 
exchange between the accused and the victim; however, only one of these cases 
involved an actual threat of violence by the victim. In three cases, the basis for 
the accused’s fear was unclear. 
The law stipulates that the offence of defensive homicide applies only where 
an accused believed that their lethal actions were necessary in order to defend 
themselves or another person.107 Where the accused was not the subject of 
violence or violent threats from the victim, it would seem less likely that the 
accused believed that it was necessary for them to respond with lethal force. 
Thus, the three cases in which non-violent exchanges precipitated the accused’s 
use of lethal force are of particular concern, because the facts in those cases may 
have established the more serious crime of murder — although it is impossible to 
tell because the full facts are not available due to the accused’s guilty plea. Here, 
lack of transparency not only raises the risk that accused persons’ convictions 
will not match their culpability, but it also hampers the public’s ability to assess 
if that risk is realised. 
Similarly, it is concerning that in three of the cases there is very little informa-
tion as to what precipitated the accused’s lethal violence towards the victim. 
Again, the lack of transparency means that it is impossible for the public to 
determine if the accused persons in those cases were appropriately convicted. 
Furthermore, it raises concerns as to the motivations underpinning the prosecu-
 
107 Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) ss 9AC–9AD. 
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tion’s decisions to accept many of the guilty pleas. This is particularly relevant 
given (as discussed above) the resource pressures faced by courts and prosecu-
tors and the potential efficiency benefits of a guilty plea. 
VIII   AC H I E V I N G  TR A N S PA R E N C Y 
The desire to formally control prosecutorial discretion emanates from the quest 
to increase accountability, reduce opportunities for misuse (or a perception of 
misuse) of power, and secure public confidence in the administration of jus-
tice.108 Controlling discretion also aims to provide, at least in theory, all indi-
viduals with the same set of rules, thereby allowing them to receive like treat-
ment regardless of factors such as race, age, socioeconomic status and gender. 
Accordingly, outside of plea bargaining, there has been a shift in many aspects of 
Victoria’s criminal justice system away from instinctive and intuitive judgments 
towards an expansion of policies.109 This has been achieved through the use of 
statutory and formal requirements, for example, by implementing legislative 
controls on the previously informal sentence indication hearings operating in 
Victoria’s Magistrates’ Court, and by establishing oversight and advisory bodies, 
such as the Victorian Sentencing Advisory Council.110 
The most effective way to eliminate the potential for idiosyncratic reasons to 
negatively affect plea bargaining, or to appear to affect ‘just’ outcomes, is to 
develop a formal policy in Victoria that can influence prosecutorial culture. This 
culture should encourage prosecutors to use their discretion consistently and in 
line with the ideals of justice. Such an outcome was observed by Miller and 
Wright where, in the context of examining discretionary charging decisions in 
the prosecutor’s office in New Orleans, they found consistent patterns of 
decision-making emerging in response to formalised requirements on conduct.111 
This included cases of a similar nature being handled similarly by different 
prosecutors, due to an office culture where formal rules helped bring about a 
singular approach to discretionary charging decisions.112 
One way in which plea bargaining in Victoria could attain greater transparency 
and adopt this office culture is to implement formal guidelines equivalent to the 
Attorney-General’s Guidelines on the Acceptance of Pleas and the Prosecutor’s 
 
108 Charles D Breitel, ‘Controls in Criminal Law Enforcement’ (1960) 27 University of Chicago 
Law Review 427; William C Louthan, ‘The Politics of Discretionary Justice among Criminal 
Justice Agencies’ in Carl F Pinkele and William C Louthan (eds), Discretion, Justice, and 
Democracy: A Public Policy Perspective (Iowa State University Press, 1985) 13; Samuel Walker, 
Taming the System: The Control of Discretion in Criminal Justice 1950–1990 (Oxford University 
Press, 1993). 
109 Asher Flynn, ‘“Fortunately We in Victoria Are Not in That UK Situation”: Australian and United 
Kingdom Legal Perspectives on Plea Bargaining Reform’ (2011) 16 Deakin Law Review 361, 
369–70. 
110 See generally ibid 370; Sentencing Advisory Council (Vic), above n 68. See also Criminal 
Procedure Act 2009 (Vic) s 61, replacing Magistrates’ Court Act 1989 (Vic) s 50A. 
111 Marc L Miller and Ronald F Wright, ‘The Black Box’ (2008) 94 Iowa Law Review 125. 
112 Ibid 129. 
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Role in the Sentencing Exercise (‘Guidelines’),113 which operate in the UK.114 
The Guidelines were first implemented in 2000 in an attempt to more clearly 
define prosecutorial discretionary powers in relation to charging decisions, the 
sentencing hearing and plea bargaining.115 They supported the principles 
enunciated in s 7 of the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK) c 42, which identified 
transparency and fairness as vital components in the effective administration of 
justice. The Guidelines have since been revised three times,116 with the most 
recent version released in March 2009. The Guidelines operate in conjunction 
with a number of other legislative and formal controls that regulate prosecutorial 
conduct and discretion in the UK, all of which aim to provide transparency to 
legal conduct and thus better uphold public interests.117 
The Guidelines are divided into five areas, which outline the required conduct 
and responsibilities of prosecutors and, where relevant, those of judges and 
defence counsel, in plea bargaining. Specifically, the Guidelines identify the 
main factors that should be considered when deciding whether to plea bargain.118 
They also explain what is required of both the prosecution and defence counsel 
when determining the facts upon which the plea bargain will be based and from 
which the court will sentence.119 Significantly, the Guidelines require that once 
an agreed basis of facts is made, this must be recorded in a document, which is 
signed by both counsel and lodged as part of official court records.120 This 
process provides transparency to the plea bargain and ensures the judge can 
accurately determine whether there is a basis for accepting or rejecting the guilty 
plea. 
The Guidelines are not themselves incorporated in statute. However, they are 
endorsed by the courts as best practice, which means that while breaching the 
Guidelines would not result in a case being dismissed, deviation from them could 
be a factor influencing an appeal court in ruling against the Crown.121 This 
system of control, Watson argues, enables the Guidelines to ‘act as a safeguard 
against unregulated and occluded discussions that eschew fairness for the 
accused, by creating a wholly transparent procedure which stands up to judicial 
 
113 Attorney-General’s Office (UK), Attorney-General’s Guidelines on the Acceptance of Pleas and 
the Prosecutor’s Role in the Sentencing Exercise (2009). 
114 For a detailed analysis of the Guidelines, see Flynn, ‘Fortunately We in Victoria Are Not in That 
UK Situation’, above n 109. 
115 Duncan Watson, ‘The Attorney General’s Guidelines on Plea Bargaining in Serious Fraud: 
Obtaining Guilty Pleas Fairly?’ (2010) 74 Journal of Criminal Law 77, 85. 
116 Ibid 78. 
117 See, eg, Crown Prosecution Service (UK), The Farquharson Guidelines — The Role and 
Responsibilities of the Prosecution Advocate (2002) (directing conduct within the prosecution 
process); Crown Prosecution Service (UK), The Code for Crown Prosecutors (2010) (controlling 
conduct in relation to the criminal justice process, from the laying of charges to the plea and 
sentencing hearings); Criminal Justice System (UK), The Code of Practice for Victims of Crime 
(2005) (outlining prosecutorial obligations to victims and recognised in s 32 of the Domestic 
Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004 (UK) c 28); Serious Fraud Office (UK), The Prosecutors’ 
Pledge (2005). 
118 Guidelines pt C. 
119 Ibid paras C4–C11. 
120 Ibid paras C1–C4. 
121 Flynn, ‘Fortunately We in Victoria Are Not in That UK Situation’, above n 109, 373–4. 
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scrutiny’.122 It thereby seeks to create the transparent, structured and accepting 
culture explored in Miller and Wright’s research,123 whereby prosecutors use 
their discretion consistently and in line with the ideals of justice. Thus, as Watson 
observes, ‘[t]he plea-bargaining system … in England and Wales manages to 
avoid becoming an American-style pressure cooker by comparatively slight 
reductions in prosecutorial discretion’.124 
Further to implementing mandatory guidelines, another mechanism to achieve 
greater transparency and accountability is expanding on the single legislative 
change introduced in Victoria which (somewhat) guides prosecutorial conduct in 
relation to plea bargaining and victims.125 Section 9 of the Victims’ Charter Act 
2006 (Vic) (‘Charter’) requires prosecuting agencies to provide victims, as soon 
as reasonably practical, with the following information: 
 (a) the offences charged against the person accused of the criminal offence; 
 (b) if no offence is charged against any person, the reason why no offence 
was charged; 
 (c) if offences are charged, any decision — 
 (i) to substantially modify those charges; or 
 (ii) not to proceed with some or all of those charges; or 
 (iii) to accept a plea of guilty to a lesser charge; … 
Thus, for the first time in Victoria’s history, a statutory obligation exists on 
prosecutors to, in effect, explain when and why they resolved a case through plea 
bargaining. 
Fourteen of the 19 prosecutorial participants interviewed in Project A 
acknowledged the significance of s 9 of the Charter both in providing greater 
victim recognition and consideration, and in altering their approaches to plea 
bargaining, in terms of increased victim consultation. The remaining five 
prosecutorial participants, while disregarding the Charter’s impact on their 
personal conduct in plea bargaining, did note the significance of these 
requirements being incorporated into legislation and acknowledged that it 
appeared to have had a positive impact in increasing the consistency and number 
of victim consultations that occurred across the OPP more generally. As 
Prosecutor D (PA) observed, ‘when I started [prosecuting], [formal] victim 
consultation wasn’t something that happened. That has been a concept which has 
been a welcome development … [and] I’d say it is largely because of the 
Charter’. Such findings demonstrate the potential for formalisation to positively 
alter prosecutorial conduct in line with Miller and Wright’s office culture. 
While the interview data secured in Project A indicated a largely positive 
change in prosecutorial conduct in relation to victim consultation, some com-
 
122 Watson, above n 115, 90. 
123 Miller and Wright, above n 111. 
124 Watson, above n 115, 90. 
125 For a detailed analysis of the Victims’ Charter Act 2006 (Vic) and plea bargaining, see Asher 
Flynn, ‘Bargaining with Justice: Victims, Plea Bargaining and the Victims’ Charter Act 2006 
(Vic)’ (2011) 37 Monash University Law Review (forthcoming). 
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ments implied that these outcomes were not always reflective of plea bargaining 
in practice. For example, Prosecutor N (PA) observed that, ‘while the Charter 
obliges us to try to explain to victims how and why things have happened in their 
case … there are still matters where plea bargaining happens, but the explana-
tions do not’. Prosecutor J (PA) similarly claimed that ‘in most cases … the 
victim is consulted and their opinion considered before we accept an offer, but 
not always’. 
These comments suggest that when plea bargaining occurs, the provision of 
transparent information may still be unobtainable for some victims. Thus while 
s 9 of the Charter provides an avenue for prosecutors to explain to victims why 
certain decision were made, thereby possibly reducing the potential for victims 
to feel alienated and disempowered by plea bargaining, we believe that there is 
scope to expand upon this requirement: there should be further guidance and 
formalisation of prosecutorial conduct in relation to plea bargaining. This is 
particularly so because one formalised requirement that fails to define, regulate 
or even acknowledge plea bargaining is unlikely to provide a guarantee that 
prosecutors will uphold their public interest roles in the process, or offer a 
mechanism to respond to the limitations surrounding plea bargaining’s non-
transparency. 
We believe that expanding on this existing legislative requirement and drawing 
from the mandatory Guidelines used in the UK would achieve greater transpar-
ency and control of the conduct of prosecutors in making plea bargaining 
decisions. Furthermore, recognising in statute that the practice of plea bargaining 
actually occurs will offer greater benefits in terms of granting a level of scrutiny 
to the process and its outcomes. This is particularly beneficial within the context 
of defensive homicide, if the strong pattern of plea deals continues. 
IX  CO N C L U S I O N 
Analysis of the operation of defensive homicide since its introduction in 2005 
illuminates key concerns regarding plea bargaining practices. While plea 
bargaining offers a mechanism through which matters can be dealt with promptly 
and without a trial, when deals are made, there is limited transparency and 
accountability in both the exercise of the prosecution’s discretion and the process 
more generally. Justice is not seen to be done. As a consequence, the legitimacy 
of any plea agreements reached between counsel are questionable, particularly 
when the prosecutor’s motivations are shrouded in secrecy and their basis for 
accepting a guilty plea may not reflect the stipulated law. If plea bargaining 
continues to be a common practice used to resolve cases, particularly those 
involving homicide offences, a greater level of transparency is required. 
For practical, pragmatic and emotion-based reasons, there is a significant need 
to evaluate the effectiveness of changes in the criminal justice system post-
reform. In the context of defensive homicide, one such reason is to sufficiently 
understand how decisions are made relating to the lowering of the accused’s 
level of culpability, particularly given that three quarters of the convictions to 
date have resulted from the Crown’s acceptance of a guilty plea. Without greater 
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transparency in the plea bargaining process, public confidence in the criminal 
justice system is negatively affected and significant and important questions 
pertaining to equality, justice and the effectiveness of Victorian homicide law 
remain unanswered. 
